My conclusion is a very simple one - only the librarian or information worker can decide what s/he needs to evaluate. Usually the call for evaluation is the result of some problem occurring in a system, or the result of the librarian being under pressure to justify expenditure on staff, or materials, or other aspects of services, or proposed changes to services. Evaluation for the sake of academic curiosity seems to me to be out of place in organizations which are seeking to fulfil valuable functions for their communities.
The links above provide access to a range of classroom materials identified according to phase to support schools. All materials are made freely available for use in school though remain subject to copyright. Further to requests, the site has also seen an additional section added above ( Other Recommended Resources ) to signpost some useful resources produced by colleagues and organisations across the UK. We hope you will continue to find P4S a useful and engaging resource to support this aspect of Safeguarding in your school. As a Lancashire, Blackpool or Blackburn with Darwen school, should you require any help or support, please contact 01772 413366. Colleagues in other parts of the country should contact their local Constabulary teams.
Another justification that has been offered for the anti-superfluity principle is a probabilistic one. Note that T2 is a logically stronger theory than T1: T2 says that a and b exist, while T1 says that only a exists. It is a consequence of the axioms of probability that a logically stronger theory is always less probable than a logically weaker theory, thus, so long as the probability of a existing and the probability of b existing are independent of each other, the probability of a existing is greater than zero, and the probability of b existing is less than 1, we can assert that Pr ( a exists) > Pr ( a exists & b exists), where Pr ( a exists & b exists ) = Pr ( a exists) * Pr ( b exists). According to this reasoning, we should therefore regard the claims of T1 as more a priori probable than the claims of T2, and this is a reason to prefer it. However, one objection to this probabilistic justification for the anti-superfluity principle is that it doesn’t fully explain why we dislike theories that posit explanatorily redundant entities: it can’t really because they are logically stronger theories; rather it is because they postulate entities that are unsupported by evidence .